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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I~ HE 
(;lt;\:t\T \!AC"F'AHLAXE } Case xo. 9051 
--~--
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
THJ<j !<'ACTS 
l'he cvitlcnce in this ca~e consists esscntia1ly (.[' a 
conden~aiion ol' the reeonl in the ease of In Rl' Stw.n/s 
Estate (Lltah), 293 Pae. (2d) G82. We are mindful thai 
the court in that ease had an opportunity to examine the 
record, and to familiarize itself with the facts. HoweYer, 
since that ca~e was decirled there ha..-c been ~'lome changeR 
in the vcrsonnel of the court, and we recognize that after 
a lapse of more than three years' time, the facts may not 
be fresh in the minds of the court. Since the statement 
of fact.s presented hy petitioner emphasize>; those facts 
favorable to him, and largely ignores those facts which 
are unfavorable, and upon which the decision below was 
based, we deem it necessary to set forth the following 
facts in bold relief: 
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II 
·--~ 
1. Although Gale Swan technically had testamen-
tary capacity, she was retarded mentally, and her men-
tality did not reach the adult leveL 
'rhe undisputed testimony of her aunt, Bell Mart-
~oll', establishes that in early childhood Gale was afflicted 
with ;;i·vere epilepsy; that when she was in her early 
twenties, she was confined in a sanitarium at Battle 
Creek, ~1ichigan; that at that time she knew nothing of 
her surroundings and did not recognize members of her 
family. When she returned to her family home in Salt 
Lake, she brought with l1er a nurse, and from that time 
&he continued under a nur~e 's eare until many yean latPr 
\\·hen a remedy was fom1d wl1ich would control her 
attacks. (R. 147-149) 
Gale paid much more attention to men than to women. 
"Gale believed in even·body. She had a cl1ildlike belief 
those people have ... Gale has alwayo been a child to 
me." (H. 153) "She had wr;- little judgment as to the 
proper thing to do." (H. 15G) 
'fl1e t r~timo11y of :Jirs. \lartsolf \I'IH corroborated 
and confirmed by the testimony of Gale'~ sister, 'I'heo 
Hendee. Gal had a ~erious illne~:; in 1949, after which 
she seemed weak and confused. (R. 191) 
Dnriug the last _1·enr~ ol' her life, she was under the 
regulnr t'at"(' of psychiatl"i~ts. She was seen profession-
all-\· ill· Dr. Frank, a psydliatTi6t, 110 less tltan 60 times 
in .tl~<·· ~-pnr l!l,·d, the Y<'::tr preceding her death. (R. 276) 
Dr. [l;trk<'. atwlhcr ps~·(•ltintri~t. 'Yho e-xamined her at 
,, 
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the time the sc<>ond codidl was executed, testified that 
she had a mental age of 12 and that she had failed to 
mature mentally. His report was based in part upon 
information furnished by Gale, by the accused, and by 
Dan Koiltopolns, another beneficiary under her 'sill. 
(K 286-288) Dr. Garlano:l Pace, another pO!ychiatrist, 
vvho cared for her o:luring the latter years of her life, fol-
lowing tbe death of his i'nther who had previously eared 
for her, testified that she did not have average intelli-
gence; that lu:r intelligence was in the range of ages 11 
to l:l, and tln1t she never matured mentally. II0 further 
testified that ment.ul deterioration may aecompany e:·,i-
lepsy; that she \Ia~ ,•molir.nally immature, and that ~u1-li 
persons are susecp!.ible io inflw•nec rmd ;mggestion. 
(R 290-291) 
Clair .:\lortensen, a trust offieer at \Valkel' Bank, who 
handled l1er JJrnpcrty for her, testifieo:l that sbe was mol'(' 
susccplihlc to men than to women ar1d that she did rw! 
have a normal adult mind. (R. 313) In hi~ opinion she had 
the age of a l'our!l1 grader· in arithmetic aud writing. 
(R. 350) 
One of her companions, DDrofhy '\Vug~taiT, tc,;tilied 
that Gale trusted people (H. 316), and that slw never: went 
any place alone d1Jring Uw time H1at sllC knew llCr 
(R. B21 ). 
2. The fact that Gale was retarded waf! known or 
should have been known to the accused. 
::1frs. Hendee, Gale's sister, i11dicated to .Mr. 1\hw-
farlanc that she was anxwus ahout hN sister Gale and 
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that she would rely upon ~iacfarlane to keep her informed. 
(R. 30) In 1950, Macfarlane learned that Gale had at~ 
tempted to make a loan to her friend Forsberg in the 
approximate amount of $3,000. When Gale's father 
learned of this, he immediately insisted that the money 
be returned. Macfarlane also knew that Mr. Swan was 
very tight-fisted. (R. 46) However, following the death 
of }[r. Swan, Gale became much freer with the accused. 
HJ1e executed to him a general power of attorney, plaeed 
in hi~ custody the pass books to all of her bank aceounts, 
and made gifts to him and members of his family of 
stocks, bonds, and cash in the approximate amount of 
$10,000. (R. 63 to 74) 
At least a year before Gale's death, and possibly as 
early as 1949 or 1950, Macfarlane learned that she was an 
epileptic. (R. 53-54) He knew that she was under the 
care of Dr. Pace, a psychiatrist (R 54), and also under 
the care of Dr. Frank, another psychiatrist. (R. i8). He 
also arranged for an independent medical examination 
of Gale before the second codicil was executed, and knew 
I hn t a psychiatrist was called i11 to assist with the exami· 
nation. (R. 42). He likewise knew that over the course of 
the years from 1046 to the time of her death, Gale w~~ 
ronfined in the hospital many times, and he '·isitcd her 
there. (R. 114·15) jJter her return from the hospital on 
ml<.' orcasion, she was under the cRre of a trained nune. 
(R. 136) 
Il'hwh of Uw foregoing evidence comes from U1e lips 
of tln' accused himself. In addition, there i~; the testimony 
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of ~·Irs. Folden, a registered nurse who cared for Gale, 
that Macfarlane came to the home quite often when Gale 
wa~ a bed patient, and that he always closed the door to 
her room when talking to her. (R 265, 272) 
Dr. Frank testifi!id that he advised Mr. Macfarlane 
tl1at Gale should have a guardian appointed. (R 276) 
3 . .\lacfa1'lane had reason to know, that in naming 
himsdf a8 a betlefieiary of hie; client's will, he was eugag-
ing in conduct which was al besl higl1ly questionable. It 
has been urged that t1lf't'e are no canons of the Utal1 State 
Bar or the ~\meriean Bar AsHoeiation prohibiting the con-
duct engaged in by Macfarlane, and ihat he had no rca~on 
to be aware of any impropriety in wln1 t he wns doing. 1 ,(•i 
us give to him the benefit of all doubt (a benefit, inciden-
tally rwt accorded to any laymen, wllO are presumed to 
know H1c law), and assume that. he harl no reasoiJ t.o be 
aware of any qw:-stion eoncerning his conduct. at the· time 
the original v.ill was drawn, still forcible notice of this 
came t.o his attrntion prior to the time the t'in;t codicil 
was drawn when a will contest was filed i.n the probate of 
another will prepared by him wherein l1c wao; de8ignat.ed 
as a beneficiary. (R. 56, 79) TJmt will contest was suh~e­
quently compromised and apparently 1facfarlane at that 
time had sufficient conerrn as to the corrertrJCSS of his pro-
cedure to warrant his makir1g some concessions in that 
will rontest. After thic; he still proceeded to draw ho 
codicils for Gale Swan, the first of which increased his 
intcrrst as a beneficiary under the will, and in the second 
of which he maintained a very substantial interest to the 
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extent that he was the largest single beneficiary nnder the 
will, rcc;eiving more than one-third of the entire estate. 
It is significant to note here that Mr. Clair ~\Iortensen, 
not an attorney, was fully aware of the impropriety of 
such condud. Although Gale wanted to remember ~l r. 
}! ortensen in her will, he requested her not 1 o do so, stat-
ing that such would be emlmrrassing to him. Certainly, 
the relationship of tr11st. officer to a client is no more deli-
cate nor of higher fiduciary status than that of attorney 
and client. 
4. With full knowledge of Gale's comlitirm, and that 
hN sist.cr was looking io him for ihc protection of her 
intere~t (R. 30)) and that he was the major beneficiary 
under the will, "\facfarlane llever so much u:; suggested 
that Gale seek independent counsel, legal or otherwise. 
'l'he testimony of the aeeused establishes that Jlo 
one knew the contents of t.he will, or any of the (~odicils, 
but Gale and the accused (R. 37-4-1). llO\Ie\er, }[acfar-
lane told .Hrs. Hendee at onC' t.ime that Gale bad ttiken 
care ol' her property and that it was in good shape. He 
never wggested to her at any time tint! she consult with 
anyone else. ( 45) 
3. 'l'he gifts to accused were wholly out of propor-
tion to :my sta111ling he might haYe as a friend and c01!· 
fident. of Gale and. her famih. The ac.cuscd became Gale's 
JH'r~onal :1ttorney in about 1944. Thereafter he repre-
~ented her in l'arious transactions. and for every service 
n'nd('red hy lJim, he billed her in full for what l1c' consid-
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ered ihe fair value of his services. All of his bills were 
promptly and fully paid. By the terms of the 'Yill and 
the eodi\·ils, the accused recein.'d in l'X\'Co>S of ~::J:i,OOO 
worth of propcrt;.~, in addition to more tlitm ~10,000 in 
f!ifts of nt~h and securities, prior to Calc's death, making 
a total of on'r' $10;),000 out of an estate of $272,000 (R. 
4:2 .. 283). 'l'hus 1\il'. ~laefarlane received more than one· 
third of the cnii.t·e estate. Kostopolus had recein>d gifts 
approximal ely 0q llfl l to tl1ose tceei n~d by ::\{r. :rvr acfarlanc, 
and bi~ ~hare of the testament al'y d i;:;posit ion was a1 iprox-
iroatdy equaL This left substantially leHs than one-third 
of the estate for the si~ter Theo, and .\unt Bell Martso~f, 
and for other close personal friends. 
The testimony of the sister Thco reveals that al-
though Theo was r:l1UTicd in 191+, ami tl1ereai'(N l':•"irJ,,d 
witl1 bcr hu;:;band, Jlrsl. l'or se>eral yean in lhc enHi., and 
then lakr on t.he wc•st coast, she maintained ll.S close as 
po~sible relationship with her o;ister Gale. Theo Yisited 
in the family homo at lca"t once eaeh year, and many year·s 
~('H'ral times a year. She abo mainLained <eonhwt ,,-ij]l 
Gale by telephone nnd r:orrc~ponrlPlll'<'. She invited Gale 
to ViHiL with hN in her home in San Francisco. She re-
garrled the relationship as a dose relationship between 
sisters throughout their lives (R. 166). She also paid the 
expen~es of Aunt Bell l'VIan~olr to r:ome hom California 
to visit with Gale and l1cr father. 
Aunt Bell Martsoll' had abo been particularly close 
to the family, especially after the deatb of Gale·~ mot.hcr. 
Before the death of Mrs. Swan ihe family had visited 
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cadi year al the home of Aunt Bell. '!'hereafter, Aunt 
Bell visited regularly at the Swan home in Salt Lake for 
periods ranging from two -weeks np to five months. Im. 
mediately after the death of ).lr~. Swan, Mrs. }ia.rtsolf 
took over the care of the Swan household and the caring 
for Gale until satisfactory help could be engaged. ~irs. 
Marisolf was finally remembered in the second codicil 
with a generous $100 bequest. 
The gifts reC'eived by "\fr . .:\lacfarlane and Mr. Ko-
stopolus were out of all proportion to what they might 
properly and normally have been expected to receive 
as friends of the family, in Yiew of the fact that Gale waa 
survi1·ed by a full sister, \1itl1 whom sl1c had maintained 
a close n!latiomhip throughouL l1cr life, and by an aunt 
who hr.d been almost a :;econd mother to ber. In addition, 
there \H're otber friends of t.hc family such as "\[r. Bean 
who 1·.isited ai !l1c home enry day, performed housdll)ld 
d1ores and regularly tDok bis meals there, and the 
Rridge~, wbo entertained Gale at eards t-wo or three times 
a week. Tbcse friendships would appear to be of at least 
equal:>tmHli11g to those of "\[r. "\faefarlane ,md Kostopo-
lus. IIoWI'Yer, .:'lir . .:'lfad'arlane and Kostopolus received 
in excess of two-thirds of tlw estall'. and the other.< re-
ceived lese; than one-third among all of them, some of 
them in amounts which were mere trifles. 
It is upou thi~ factuul background, aided 11~· the pre-
sumption ol" [raud, aN set forth in this eomt'~ decision in 
tl1c l:'wnn cnAl', npon which tlw findings of the hearing 
t·ommiH,·.ion and the bar commission were based, and upon 
wl1it·l1 thp~· shonld be affirmed. 
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ARGUJ.IENT 
As Wfl<'> noted in the oral argum•:nts before the hear-
ing- committee (R. :i56), the Supreme Court has already 
concluded in thE' \1ill coni<:~t case tl1at tl1erc l1;1~ been a 
civil fraud commitlrd hy an at.lonJL'Y against his client. 
The basic question to be t1cre decided i~ whNh1·r an at-
torney who has c1mnnitt.ed a L'ivil fraud agaim;t bi.-·. client 
should be disciplined. ln reaching tlw conclusion that a 
1'i1·il wrong had been commit.t.ed, tlw Supreme Court hm; 
s:1itl in the will IJOnicst 1'116l' that it eoulrl not RO hold on 
the facts adtluc·ed wiJl10ul th0 aid of a prenmption of 
fraud. 
No new evidence ltas been introduced, nor was there 
any other cvid0nce available to the [lroser.ut.ing comm!t-
ier. At ihc outset, we suppo01c it must be determined 
what effect the court should give to previom; ciYil deter-
mination that a fraud has been committed. We do not 
contend that this is eon trolled by the procedures in ca~c~ 
where an attorney is conYictcd of a felony in a separate 
criminal case, hut. the distinclion we seek to make here 
ean be demonstrated by reference to the procedures in a 
felony case. After an attomey is convicted of a felony in 
a criminal case, discipline automatically follows. The 
court docs not go bcl1ind the Ycrdict to re-examine the 
facts to see lww t.he conviction resulted. It accepts the 
prior judicial detnmination of guilt. It is suffiiJicnt that 
the attorney has been tried and convided. 
In this case the defendant was charged in a civil suit 
vrith having defrauded his client and after an exhaustiYe 
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trial an:l an appeal to this court, it has now been :finally 
adjudged that the defenda11t did defraud his client. The 
property which he sought to obtain by reason of the fraud 
was tuken from him. Query: Docs this adjudged fact 
that lw has pNpetrated a civil fraud against his client by 
itself justify dis(•iplinary ad ion; if not. will this fact be 
consiUctiJd at all: or will the court disregard tllC civil trial 
and the facts therein adjudicated and hear the matter 
anew! 
It dar~ present a somewhat anomalous situation if 
the defendant can he adjudged in a contested civil suit to 
}Jan· been guilty of fraud against. lliJ> client and in a dis-
!mrment pron~cding based on the same facts can be l1eld 
not to he guil1}' of any fraud, but to be dean as a hound's 
tooth and immune from discipline. lf the maHer is to be 
considered auew, and the presumption of fraud which was 
raised in the eivil suit ('lH\ not be r11ised in the disbarment 
pr·oecctlings, of course, this end result might well be 
reaehed. The general public is then told 011 the one hand 
that there is ample evidence to ~upport the trial court'~ 
:finding that the pd.ilioner defrauded his client in the civil 
~uit but in the di~harment procecdin~.; where the same 
factR are rc•1 ir·wr·d again, and tlt<' court c01wludcs (be-
cause it ean not. consider the presumption) that there was 
uo fraud and the attor11n·',., conduct was enti.rcly proper . 
. \s i~ point(•d out in more detail by the authorities 
d\•d ]'('low, the Supreme Court. h;> licensing a lawyer. 
J"ccommends the lawy('l' to the public as morally qualified 
to n•prp,.;ent (']i,•nts in matters involving the highest trust 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and confidence. If we are to ~urry t.he argument made by 
the ncen~rrl here into effeet, '""e certainly ean not help Lnt 
~hake the confidence of the public in the entire legal pro-
fes.,ion. l11 the civil case this court has alT'e>~d~ helrl that 
the rvideTTI'I\ aided by the presumption, amply supported 
th~e trial eourl 's finding of fraud by an attonu•y in regard 
to Uw affair.~ ol' l1i~ client. The same evidrnn~ i» again 
before the court lor r0Yiew. 'l'hrough the appli1·n1ion of 
a h·gal nicety, tlTc' uu·n~cd urge>< t.hP court to hold that 
his conduct ·was entirely prrprr, that what he ditl I.e; ],j,o; 
cli,~nt y;as without fault, Umt he should be given a dr•:Hl 
bill of health and tl1is eourl ,Jwuld continue to n·<·<m~ml•nd 
him to the pnblie :1~ in every way worthy of tlu;ir (1"11'-'i 
and confidenc·e. 
lf the court accepts this argument l1er0, il I ells the 
pulllic that there is some tedllliculit.y in lhe law which 
"'rill permit the court to raise a pr0s.umpJion of fraud to 
protcd a dieiJt wl10 ha~ been impoRrd upon, but that th<:> 
law will not permit the eourt t.o rai;;e the Rame presump-
tion Jo proted the pul1lic againo;t future miseoiJdnc.t.; tln1t 
the pllhlie should 11ccepJ ihe high court's reeomrncndu-
tion of Jhe lawyN tB a man of the highest int~:grily, al-
though thr court. has already held that tl1e C"vi1lenc0 ir; 
the civil ;;nit amply supports a finding that he defmuderl. 
his client. N otwitho;tanding this adjutliealed fact of fraud, 
tlw court must now find from the same 0virlence that hi~ 
condu("t was entirely proper, jhat he Rhould not h~· di,.wi-
plined at all, and that the eonrl slJOuld hold him out to 
the pnblie without ecnsurc or criticism as a man worthy 
of the highest trust and confidence from hiR clients. Such 
11 
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an anomalous result ought not to be permitted by the law, 
and wht>n one 1;xamines the true nature of the right to 
practice law and the true nature of a disbarment pro-
ceeding, we submit. that there is no reason why the pre-
sumption can not or should noi be rai8Ni in a disbarment 
proeeeding. 
If the effect of Ole civil suit is t.o be disregarded, and 
tliL' eYidenee is to he reviewed anew in the disbarment 
ptoceedings, then the issue ol' law a~ to whether the pre-
J:mmption will be raised becomes a 1·ital consideration. 
Our brief is primarily direrted to that point. We de-
sire, however, to 110te that the presumption does not stand 
alone. U is raised for the very practical reason that. gen-
eral!) only t.he attorney and the client parti<-'ipated in the 
conferences and they and only they know what happened. 
In this case the client is dead, and if there \\·ere 110 pre-
sumption, fraud eould seldom be pro1·ed. ln a civil suit 
where facts which in and of themselves lay a suspicion of 
fraud at the door of the accused are proved, this places 
upon him tl1e burden of coming l'orward to conYi11cc the 
trier of tlw fad that no fraud was involved. The same 
difficult~· of proof exist~ in a disbarment proceeding a~ 
exisL~ in a civil action. The difficulties of finding t.'l·idence 
are equally great. 'l'hr circumsta nr'l'~ raio;ing tlll' Sllspicion 
r>l' l'raud are the same, and there is much common sen~e in 
pla('in~ the same hnrden nf ex]ilnnation on the accusrd. 
We emplw~ize that tltr' presumption need not and 
dOI'H not stailrl alone. Thrrr' are facts cmdisputahly proved 
s]IO'.\·ing tlwt the aeClJHrd was dealin~ with a client ,,·ho 
1:2 
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was mentally retarded. He was told by her sister that the 
family was looking to the accused to protect her interests. 
(H. 30) During her lifetime, he wt,; tlw redpient of var-
iou.-J sub8tantial gifts (H. 63-14) and l1e knew that his 
client. who wa~ mentally rct.anJcd, w:ts making like gifh; 
to ::.\Ir. Kostopulo.~, wl10 according to the finding of the 
court, was guilty or fraud and undue influenee. l<'inally, 
tli(· accused did draft a will which made him a major 
beneficiary. He did so, even though near tl1at ver·y time 
he was beir1g charged in another suit wit\1 improper (Til-
dJ.wt in drafting a will for another dient whieh al8o namcd 
him as a major Leucfieiary. He must ·have seen a sufli6c-nt. 
problem conn'rning the testamentar;t capaeity of l1i.~ 
client in tl1is ease to warrant taking her to a doctor. The 
tlndnr called in a TJ~)'('lJiatrist and thereafter the will was 
e:-..~~{'111\~d. Ccr1,1inly tl1e defendant ought to haYe the bur-
den of <'xJllflining his r•ondud. and this burden can only be 
placed upon him hy raising a presumption whieh v.i.ll shift 
the risk of persuasion. 
We have divided our discmmion of this presumption 
into thr·ee patis. 
We first refer t.o the U tab eases concerning the nature 
of the right or pri\'ilege of praetieing law. Sinee the prac-
tice of law is a privilege and not a right, and since the 
purpose of disbarment proccctliug~ is to purify tlre Bar·-
not to punish-we tl1ink lhere is reason for raising 1l1e 
presUIIJption of fra111l in a disha.rment proceeding. \Vc 
secondly examine the- na.tul'e of the presumption itself; 
and finally cite tlre authorities which permit the preAump-
tion of fraud to be considered in a disbarment proceeding. 
13 
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I. XATURE OF DlSCIPLIXAHY PROC!iJEDIXGS 
BY THE BAR cm.nussrox: 
A. lli8fory of the Right to Pmctice Lan-: 
The rigflt to practic·c lm\- is a special privilege which 
is held during the good bdm\·ior of the pcr.~on so licensed. 
}.:]ember~ of tl1e legal profe:;;;i.on are charged with a par-
t i(·ularly higl1 moral and elhi(·al responsibilit~ because 
they receiYc OlC confidences of the pullli(~. Lawyers are 
Ui~ciplined or disbarred if at any time i1 f!eems that their 
character is such that it docs not eompletely justify the 
confidence and tru~t that the public mu~t place in them. 
:.Inch has lJecn said and written about the 11at.urc of 
the rigM to pnH"t i('c law. lt is not a property right, nor is 
it a privilegC" 1mder the privileges and immm1ities elausc 
of tiH; l•'ederal Constitution. The Utah rase of Rucken-
brod Y. Jlullins, 102 Ct.ah 548, cono;idered the attorney's 
duty to defend indigeJJt persons charged with criminal 
ads. That ease give~ a rather comprehensive history of 
the legal profession and the nature of U1e right to prac-
tice la\\-. Since this subjed is. of consirlerable importance 
in the instant proceeding, extensive quotc~ from that (:ase 
migbt be helpful. 'l'he Rucke11brod case, in turn, quotes 
h1•nvily from other sourcp;.c and th<'i<C quotations are in-
cludl.'ll in the following excerpts: 
'"l'he majoriJ~- of ju1·i~dif·tions hold that an 
n j t ,ll'IIP\' i~ an officer of t lw ('Onrt witl1 many rights 
nnd 11Ti1 il('~l's, nnd must accept his office cum 
Olll'\'\','' 
14 
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"~ ~ ~ Historically there ran be little donbt 
that tlte nttorney who represented a client before 
the courts did enjoy special rights and priYileges. 
'l'he historical growth of the right of an attorney to 
praelire before the common law courts in F~ngland 
is den~ lope• I l1:- tl:<' S IIJ•l'Cme Court of Illinois in tl1c 
case of In re IJny, e( al, 181 Ill. 13,54 XE fl4G, G49, 
50 LRA .)El, the court there said: 
'Originally, no one could appear hy attor-
ney without the speeial warrant of the king, 
issuing out of chancery or under seal, grant-
ing thr privilege. The king was eonsidert•d 
tlw fOJmttJin of j11~tice, and, a~ he could not in 
person d0ride all ronirovPrsiC's and Temedy all 
wrow:s, tlll' ir1jur0d parlies w0rc: referred to 
tltc' proper for·um, aud \Hits W<'l'C l'rnr~lr·d in 
his name to his judge.~. Suitf; were begun i11 tl1ut 
way, and when he granted the prh·ileges in 
question it was a~ tl ptlrt. of that system, and 
not in a legif!lative capacity. ln tl riYilizerl 
country, wh0re tlw rigl1ts of person,; ll'er<: to 
he determined in arcordanel..l witl1 esUJloli~lred 
rule~, eithrr sttJt.ut.or·y or· pmmulgated l•y tl•e 
C011rt~. t.l1e employml•nt of persons ac•quainted 
wit.ll tlw~e rules bec•.ame a necessity, both to 
Ow par(.i<'s and the court. Persons uulearnerl 
in tl:e law cm1 neither aid a litigant nor the 
eouri, and parliament, at different times, ex-
tended the right of t.he litigant to appoint an 
attomey to represent him in court. Maugl1, 
A ttyi'. Append. fi, 7. In 1292, Edward I madr 
an order hy which he appointed the lord chief 
juf!tice of the cmrd of rommon pleas tlnd Ow 
rest of his fpJlow juslirrs of that court., tint! 
they, aceording to their discretion, slwuld 
provide and ordain from C'Yery county eedain 
attumeys and appt·cntices of t.lw he:-;t and 
most apt for tl•eir learning tlnd skill, who 
might do service to i1is court and people, and 
]_;) 
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those so chosen only, and no other, ,;hould fol-
low his court and transact the affairs thereof. 
the said king and his council then deemingth~ 
number of seven score to be sufficient for that 
employment, but it was left to the discretion 
of the said justiee~ to add to that number or 
dimini;;h it, as they should see fit. 7 Pol. & }d. 
Hi;;. Eng. Law, 194; Dugd. Orig. J.l41. The 
prni'cs;;ion of att.orney was placed under the 
control of the judges, and the discretion to 
examine applicants as to their learning and 
quali!ications, and to admit to practice, was 
exercised from that day by the judicial de-
partment of the English government, and 110 
legislation sought to deprive the court of the 
power in that ,·r~pect, or t.o invest it in any 
other branch of the govcrnmeiJt.' 
''The court in some detail then discussed the 
variou~ early English Statutes relating to admis-
sion to practice; the fuJIC:l ion of t.he Inns of Court; 
and the role of "solieitors' and 'barristers'; and 
concluded that: 
''I'he function of determining whether one 
who seeks to become an officer of the courts, 
and to conduct cau,;es therein is ~ufficicntly 
acquainted with tllC rules established by the 
lcgio;lature and the courts, governing the 
rif'hts of parties and under which justice i> 
administered, pertains to the courts them-
selve;;_ ~ ~ ~ 1'he order of requisite qualifi-
cations, under sueh rc,;trictions and lirrrita-
t in us as may lll' properly imposed by tl1e legis-
lature for the protection aud welfare of the 
public. Thr fad that the legislature may pre-
scrilw the qualifications ol' doctors, plumlwrs, 
horse;<hoeJ·~. and persons following otlwr pro-
fc~8ions or callings; not connected with the 
judicial system, and maY Ray what shall be 
16 
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evidenced of such qualifications, can have no 
influence on this question. A license to such 
pel'wns confers no right to put the judicial 
power in motion or to participate in judicial 
proceedings. The attorney is anecesomry part 
of the judicial ,.,ysicm, and l1i6 vocation is not 
merely t.o find persons who are willing to ha Vl' 
lawsuits. He is the first one to sit in judg-
ment on every ca~e, and wh0t.her the court 
slmll be called upon io act depends on his 
decision.' ~ ~ ~ 
'The courts of the King'~ Bench and 
Common .Ple:1s had from t.h0 first, each admit-
t('d its own staff of atlonwys and tl1c Jjjx-
cbeqnel' seems to have had a staff of clerks 
who acted as attorneys. Xo doubt the same 
persons often acted tb attorneys hot.h in the 
Common Pleas and in the King's Benc-h -
this is slwwn by an onler of 1564-, whid1 at-
tempted in vain to suppress this praetice. But 
it is olwious that the necessity for separate 
admission in each court emphasized the fact 
that attorneys were the officers of that eo\lrt; 
and the same fad was still furt.her empha-
sized by orders for their constant attendanec• 
in their re~pective ("Ourts, and by tlwir po~­
session of t.h0 same privileges of exception 
from rmblic sen-·iee, aml irmnnnit.y from suit, 
(·xc<'pl jn their ow1J court, as the other officials 
of the various courts enjoyed.' 
"* * ~ In People v. Culkin, 248 NY 4G5, 162 
KE 487, 490 60 ALR. 851, Ch. J. Chardozo traces 
the hi~tory of the pow(lr of the court~ to make gen-
eral jnqniri.es into the c•onduct of its own oJ1irers, 
the members of the bar, awl concludes that at a 
very early date the courts ex-ercised ripirl control 
over the professiona~ conduct of m-embers of the 
legal profession. He states: 
17 
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''l'hus by Section I of an order made in 
,\{iehadmas Term 1654 by the Court of Pleas 
. ' as well as by a like order of the Court of rp-
per or King's Bench, attorneys were required 
to give notice of their chambers of habitations 
"und(•r pain of being put off t.he roll"; no 
one \Jnder like penaUy was to practice in an-
other\; name, nor was anyone knowingly to 
permit another to pradille in hi~ mlme, ex-
cepting in warrants of attorney for common 
recoveries "for the preveiltion of mainte-
nnw·e and broeage, no attorney was to be 
le~see in an ejectment nor hail for a defendant 
in tl(i.s eourt in any action." Cooke's Rules, 
Ordrrs and X otices of the CourtR of Common 
Pleas and King's Bench, Michaelmas 'ferm, 
] 654.' 
"Such duties and others are placed upon at-
torneys on the theory that attorneys are officers of 
the court. In speaking of the;;e duties Cardozo fur-
ther ~ny~ in People v. Culkin, supra: 
':\I embership i11 the bar is a privilege bur-
dened with condition.:;. 111 re Rouss, supra, 221 
::\'Y (81 ), page 84, 116 I>;E (782), 783. The 
appellant was received into that ancient fel-
lowship for something more than private 
gain. He "became an officer of tl1e court, and 
like the court i(~elf, an instrument or agency 
to advance tl11; ends of justice. His coopera-
tion with the eonrt was due, whenever justice 
would be imperiled if cooperation wa~ l'ith-
held. lie might be assigned as counsel for the 
need;.·, in causes criminal or eiYil, serving 
without pny. Code l'rim. Proc. ~ 308; Ci1·iJ 
PrndieP _\rh, .,qoG, 198. He might lie di-
ro·("i('(l by ;;ummary order to make restilution 
( o n client of Hl(llH'Y" or other property wrong-
l"(d!~· 11·itlill('ld. In re H. ........ 87 NY fUl. 
18 
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He might be censured, suspended, or dis-
barred for "any conduct prejudicial to ihe 
administration of justice." Jndir,iary Law, 
§88, Subd. ::!. All this is undisputed.' 
"'I'he present status of the attorney in our 
judicial system has been a result of historical de-
velopment which dates back for some sen'n cen-
turies. Regardl0~s of what may have happened in 
some jurisdietiom to the rip:lit.s and pr·ivileges of 
attorneys, the right to praetirJe before the r:ourt as 
an officer of the court, still remains. \VIrile doe-
tori'\, plumbers, electricians, barbers, et.c., may sell 
t.heir time and skill to the public by virtue of their 
license from the sJ.HtP, ihc attorney alone has the 
right. t.o set t.hc judieial mac·hincry in mot.ion in 
bclialf oi' aTtother and to thus participate as an 
officer or tlre court in a judicial proceeding. This 
J"ight springs from his status as an officer of the 
court. To properly function it is neces!ltuy that 
courts retain control of their officers. The attor-
ney's part haEt developed until he now is a neces-
sary and essential part of our judicial machinery. 
"t * ~ In addition to this privilege, it has 
been comisiently lteld that the right of the legis-
lative branr:h ot" the government to regulate and 
control attorneys is subject to the ir1herent power 
of the t'(JUJ"t ultimately to control admission io 
praeticc awl disbarment. ·while the languagP in 
Ili_qgin8 v. Burton, G4 Utah 502. 232 P. 914, might 
indicate U1at we do not adhere to this rule, in a 
later case, ln re flarr:lay, 82 Utah 288,24 P. 2d 302, 
303, we ~~ at.ed: 
'ft is quite generally held that the power 
i~ inherent in the proper eourt to discipline, 
suspl'nd, or disbar an attorney for miscon-
dud, i.ndCp<'WJent OJ' llll)" express provision of 
a ~tntut.e ("Oril·~·rring such authoril.".' 
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"In support of thi8, we cited an earlier case, 
ln. re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 P. 390, 392, where we 
stated; 
'Nor can the Legislature limit the courts 
in their rights to determine the moral quali-
fications of Uwir officers or prevent them from 
refusing to admit morally incompetent per-
sons to practice, nor compel them to retain 
such upon the roll. * ~ ~ The courts, and 
not. juries or legislators, mmt ultimatelv de-
termine l[utdifications and fit.11ess of -their 
officers.' 
"If the right to engage in the practice of law 
wc•n• one of those rights protected by the 14th 
Amendment. it might he unconstitutional to re-
quire those who engage in tile pnwtice of law to 
submit to the burdens now placed on the legal pro-
fession. But the cases hold Jhat tile rigl!t to prac-
tice law in the state courts i" not a privilege or an 
immunity of a citizen of the Cnited States which 
is protected by the 14th Amendment. In Ex parte 
Lockwood, lJ± US 116, 14 S. Ct. 1082, 1083, 38 
L. Ed. 929, the court refused to reYi.ew the order 
of the Virginia Sup. Court which denied the appli-
cation of a woman for admittance to the bar of 
Virginia. The court, in so holding, said; 
'The right to control and regulate the 
granting of license to practice law in the 
courts of a state i.,_ one of those powers th~t 
was 110t transferred for its protection to the 
federal government, and it8 exerdse is in no 
manner governed or controlled by citizenship 
of the United States in the party seeking such 
license.' See also Philbrook v. Newman, C.C., 
85 F. 139, Mil che/1 \'. Greenough, 9 Cir., 100 F. 
2d 184; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 \Vall 130, 83 
llS 130,21 L. Ed. 442, Robinson's case (In re 
Robinson), 131 .:.!a8-". 376,41 Am. Rep. 239. 
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"\Ve, therefore, conclude attorneys do have 
privileges. They do enjoy the right to participate 
as officer~ in a judicial proceeding and the right 
to set the judicial machinery in motion. The coud 
in admitting the attorney to practice, presents him 
to the public as worthy of its eonfidf'nce in all of 
his proressional duties . .An attorney holds his of-
fice during good beha.rior a-nd may only be de-
pr-i·nPd of it fur misconduct ascertained a11.d de-
cla-red by the judgmn~t of the court. Courts, by 
retaiuin.g ultimate co1drol of admission to prac-
tice and of disbarme-nt, have undertaken to proffrf 
the honor and high standimg of the legal profession 
by refusing to admit those applica·ut.o who lack th13 
neces.~ary educational qualifications or H'fio are 
morally incompeten-t, and dropping from the rolls 
those gu.ilty of misconduct." (emphasis added) 
The next "Ctah case of eon~cqucnC'e explaining the na-
ture of d1c right to prat'\i1·c law was Du:c·i~; v. Ogden ('·ity, 
215 P. 2d 616. That. ease lJOnsidered the rigllt. of the City 
of Ogden to require lawyers to ohtain u City liceme. In 
holding ihal the ordinance was valid, ihe Court again 
discus~ed t.he position of members of the legal proff'ssion. 
The Utah case~ thu~ demonstrate that the practice of 
law has been a special fr·mrdrise from lhe very beginning. 
It iH clear that one who engages in the pradice ol' ht·w 
holds that franchi6e only during hil-l good behavior and 
so long as he maintains an impcecablc moral character·. 
Indeed, to Ray that one has a right to practice law is prub-
ably a misnomer, for in a more aceuraJ(' ~ensc, it is no 
"right" at all, but is merely a special privilc~e I"OJldi-
tioned upon moral worthiness. 
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B. Presumption of Innocence. 
\Ve now move to a consideration of the question as 
to whether tlwre is a preumption of innocence in a disei, 
plinary proceeding whieh is not present in an ordinary 
civil proCC"<?-ding nnd whicl1 will ofTset the presumption of 
fraud. n i~ elemt'ntal in thE' law tha.t a defendant being 
prosecuted for alleged criminal acts is "presumed'' inno-
cent until proven guilty. This really means 110thing more 
than that the prosecution h11s the burden of proving the 
defendant guilty beyond a reaf!onable doubt, and if the 
guilt is not tbus proved there can be 1111 COT1vidion. Pro-
fessor ).lcCormick explains tlw l1i~tnr) of this presump-
tion of innocence in the following terms: 
''Th,, pres;,mpfi(jJt of inJwcence. 'I'l1is phrase, 
taken o1·er from contincnfal usage, wus merely a 
geueral rule that in ab~cnce of contrary facts it 
was to be as8umed H1at any person·~ conduct upon 
a giYen oecasion w11s lawful. :So stated, the as· 
sumption doubtless has a fair basis in probability. 
J3ut when i1. came to he employed, in argument 11nd 
in instructing juries, in eriminal trial~ under the 
common law, it became a source of mysticism and 
confusion. As avplied to the ac.cnsed, any assump-
tion, o1· 'presumption' of innocence in the popular 
sense of an infcn·Jt(·r based on probability, i:; 
absurd. Tlw probubility is the n'H'l'SE'. 'T'he as-
sumption of innoeence which is ret~sonable in the 
absence of contrar~- facts becomes quite unrealistic 
wlll'n we indude in the picture the facts that the 
per:;on has been officially charged with the crime 
and has he en brought to trial. N everthelesg, the 
phrase 'presumption of innocence' ha~ been adopt-
ed hy jwlg''" as a conYenient introduction to the 
statement of tliL' lmrdens upon the prosecution, 
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first of producing evidence of the guilt of the ac-
cused and, second, of finally persuading the jury or 
jttdge of Lis guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.. But 
tl1e popular meaning of presumption as an infer-
Cll~e from probability has lent a false connota-
tion, and dei'C'IISI; counsel have naturally used the 
phrase in a1·gument and in request .. ~ for instruc-
tiom;, as if it meant that there wa~ an inherent 
probability that one officially charged and tried for 
a rrime is innocent." 
' ' ' 
''The supposed presumption of the innocence 
of an accused, in fact, is not in any common usage 
of the term a pres11mpt.ion a.t all. It is not a pre-
sumption in the popular sense of an inference from 
prohahilit.y, 110r i~ it a preJ:Jumpt.ion in tl1e legal 
~rllN<' or a rule as to the effect of facts proven as re-
quiring or permitting other facts t.o he taken aJ:J 
true." McCormick, Evidence, pp. 647 -O!J (Hl54). 
Tl1e rtah Supreme Court has al~o tl1oroughly ana-
lyzed this "presumption," but it recognizC'd e%CIItia11y 
the same mear1ing in the Swan case, supnt, \1hcn it. saiU: 
"The expresf!ion that. there is a 'presumption 
of innocence' if! frequnPtl.v \JSetl e\'l'll i11 (·ivil caHc~ 
where mif!conduct i~ im•olved, hut. it is usually used 
to indicate a permi~~iblc infetenee and not a mml-
datory presumption. But even where a. presump-
tion is indi(·akd, 01uch presumption nullifies other 
presumptions only in cases where the facts giving 
rise to the presumption have no tendency to e~tab­
li~h guilt and are not by their nature oppo8ed to 
innocence. Such presumption of fraud and undue 
influence iR everywhere recognized but. we know 
of no case whicl1 hold~ that ~uch presumption i~ 
nullified by tllC prr~umvt.ion of innocene0. lf such 
were the effect of a pr·esnmption of inno(Jencc, it 
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would completely nullify all presumptions of fraud 
and undue influence for in every such Gaso the con-
fidential advisor is presumed to be guiHy of betrav-
ll:Jg the confidence placed in him. It would be us;> 
lesf! to hold tl1at there is a presumption of fraud 
and undue influence against him whi(•h is nullified 
by a <'Ontrary presumption of innocence.'' (pa.,.e 
693-4 of ~93 P. 2d) "' 
In summa l'.V, then, a I t.on1eyo; are privileged to engage 
m a profession which requires the highest moral and 
ethical responsibility. When a member of the bar is guilty 
or misconduct, the Comt i~ charged witli the respon-
sihility of diseiplininK and disenfranchising that 
attorney. Di~!'iplinary proceedingfl are tlJU~ designed to 
protect the p11hlic by dropping from membership those 
members of the bar wl1o fail to deserve the confidences of 
the public. The New .Jersey Courl ~11mmarized the pur-
poRe of disciplinary proceedings i11 the following words: 
'' 'l'he object is not punishment of tl10 oJFonder, 
buJ rather tlJC disqualification in the public inter-
est of a prad iti0110r of the law who has been guilty 
of misconduct indicative of moral unfitness for the 
profession." 1 u re Frankel, 20 X J 558, 120 A. 2d 
603 (1956) 
Even if disbarment proceedings wrre punitin•, it is 
unlikely that a preflumption of innocence could offset the 
presumption of fraud and undue influence. In light of 
the fact that such proceediugs are essentially for the 
protection of the public, it srrms dear that no pre~ump­
tion of imlm'('ll('(' is present. There flurely is nothing in 
the law to indicate that an attorney charged with mis-
eondud can claim a presumption of innoccnre in disbar-
ment proceedings in order to lessen his burden of proof. 
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II. THE NA'rURFl OF THE PRESF.\IPTIOX OF 
\<'RAUD IN CIVTL PROCEEDIXGS. 
Legal authorities universally recognize that there is 
much confusion which surroundR the terms of "presump-
tion,'' '' inferenee,'' and ''burden of perRuasion.'' ), good 
diseussion in this hazy area if! found in McCormick. Evi-
denoo, Seetions :l06-22 (1Y54), and an analysis of t11c 
Utah m~c'S is found in 1~tah Law Rev-iew, ;):196-219 
{1956). But the Utah Supreme Court has made a elcar 
pronouncement in the very case that gaYe rise to tl1e in-
stant disriplinary proceeding, and it, therefore, seems 
unneecssary to consider authority other than In re Swan's 
Estate, 4 Ctah 2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682 (1956). 
In the Swa;n case the court focused its attention upon 
the presumption of fraud and undue influence w}1id1 
arises when a confidential adviser drafts a ·will for his 
client and names him~clf as beneficiary. Tt was conrcded 
that, even among tllC Utah cases, substantial confusion 
existed. 'l'he court distingui:;hcd between the h11rden of 
persua,<;ion and the burden of making n prima facie case, 
.;tating that in the latter situation the burden i~ satisfied 
and the presumption vanisheo; with the introduetion of 
prima facie ev-idence, and the other party still has tl1r 
burden of persuading the faet finder. \\Then the burden 
is one of persuasion, however, prima facie evidence is in-
sufficient and the presumption remains, and the party 
attempting to rebut Llie presumption of fraud mu"t ("ome 
forth with evidenc·e which will be ·weig-hed against the pre-
sumption. It was held that the instant situation was one 
requiring a burden of persuasion. 
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'rhe court next examined the weight of evidenM re-
quired to oYercome the presumption of fraud when the 
burden is one of persuasion. It wall noted that some cases 
require a preponderancT of the evidence (non-existence 
of the presumed fact. i~ more prol.Jable than its existence), 
o!.l1er cases require clear and convincing n·idence (non-
C'x:i~tcnte of the presumed fad is very highly prol1able), 
and still others require proof lJeyOlJd a reasonable donUt 
(all rea~onabk doubt of t.he non-existence of the pres1rmed 
faet mn~t. be eli.m.inated). The court observed that there 
\Vas considerable Utah authority to tlw efff'("t that in cases 
of presumed fraud the ptcsumpJion should only be over-
come by clear and convincing eYidencC'. Tt ,,.as felt, how-
ever, that the lw~l rule was the orw requiring a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and the court e:xpre~sly 
so held: 
"After earcful study and considerati011 we con-
elude that thiR presumption shifts the burden onto 
the confidential adYisn· of per~uadi11g or convinr, 
ing the fact :finder by a preponderance of the evi-
dence chnt no fraud or undue influeJJCe was 
exerted, or in other 11 nrd~. he has the burden of 
convincing the fact Iinder from the evidence that 
il i~ more probable thar he ar-ted perfectly fair 
\l-ith his c'onfidaut; that he made complete disclos" 
urc of all material iJll'ormation available' and took 
110 unfair ad•·antag-e of his superior position than 
that he ('xerted fraud or undue influence io obtain 
the benefit~ in question. This i8 contran- to our 
l10lding in the .r ardine ease, whicl1 i,- supported by 
the L\dil"ornia ('11~Ps and some other decisions thai 
clear and convincing eYidenee to the coJltrary is 
nc('('>'S<HY to overcome such presumption. 1\'e 
reach this conclusion been use Wl' feel tlitlt the rule 
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is more clear and understandable than the rule re-
quiring clear and convincing evidence; that this 
rule is more apt to produce a ju~t. re>;ult is more 
generally reco;<nized as the correct rule governing 
tl1is situation." 
The court therefore held that (1) the instant l'acts 
gal'e rise to a prco;umption of fraud and undue infltH:nce; 
(2) that U1is presumption could be overcome by a 
preponderance ol' the evidence; (3) that Mr. :Macfarlane 
came forward witlt a prima facie ca.'le which was not a 
preponderance of the evidence and which was, thereJ'ore, 
insufficient to rebut ihe presumption; and (4) that, C'OJl-
~equently, the trial court's finding of fraud and uwlue 
influence sl1ould he affirmed. 
III. PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED WITH ALL OTHER EVIDENCE 
IN DISBARIIIENT PROCEEDINGS. 
As explained in Section fi of this .\f enwrandum, the 
Swan case holds that tl1e presumption of fraud in eivil 
proceedings can he overcome by a vrep,J·n.rlerance of the 
evidence. 1'hls l~ lo ~ay U1Ht the vet")' nature of the 
confidential relationship c-reales a prima faeie presump-
tion of fraud, and this prPsumption is only overcome when 
the attorney priJres thai his rondur:t wail proper. }inch 
has been written about this same presumption when an 
attorney i~ being di,.;lmrred and the most exhaus-
tive treatment j~ found in a receJit Ne\1 Jcrs''Y 
case, In the ilfatter of Douga~ Herr, .-Jft,,rney wnd 
Connselorat Law,:!.:!. X. J. 276,123 A. 2r1 70fi (1936). 'l'l1is 
ease is helpful for t.wo reasons; first, the facts arr. similar 
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to those in the instant proceeding, and second, the New 
Jersey Conrt requires tlie same proof to overcome a pre-
sumption of frand in a civil proceeding as did the Utah 
court in the Swan case. Also helpful is the fad tliat this 
case was elaborately researehed, argued and re-argued 
before tbe Xew Jersey Court of Appeals. "\fr. Justice 
Brennan, before ascending to the position of the Ju.stice 
of the United States Supreme Court, wrote the opinion, 
from whi1·h we quote: 
"Respondent has been called upon to answer 
~pecific charges of allP;..ced unethi(•al and improper 
conduct, principally Hmt i.n -various -way~, for his 
rwrsonal profit and gain, he abused and took ad-
\Untage of the confideu('C reposed in him by his 
dient, Mii<~ Bertha Breelnvoldt. By direction of 
this court he a rings on the cl1arges were l1ad before 
Judge Grim~ha 11· in the Chanerry Division. Judge 
Grim shaw filed conclusions finding that some 
charges are SlJ~tained by the e-vidence and others 
were not. Briefs wen~ submitted io this court and 
we have had oral argument and reargument here.'' 
There was a conflict in tl1e evidence us to }Iiss Brech-
woldt':; mental capacity. Respondent l1ad beell the attor-
ney of Miss Rrcehwoldt for a number of years and he 
drafted, or (·flu~l'd to be drafted, certain trust instrument,; 
and a will for :.\liss Bn'eliwoldt. These instruments made 
respondent sole iruslr(' with powers so broad a~ to enable 
him to benefit. himself. 'l'hc ('State of l\liss Brechwoldt 
exceeded $400,000. Respondent w11s charged with the pre-
sumption of fraud in that the fRds were sufficient to 
establish a prima farie ease, and respondent attorney was 
call('d to come forth and prove himself innocent of any 
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improper conduct. He failed to establish his proof, and 
he was disbarred. 'l'hc court defined the attorney's duty 
in the following words; 
''Confidence so reposed has ever been !luffi-
cient reason, in equit.y, for requiring t11e recipient 
to ac,•cpt the onus of proving -uberrim-a. fides when 
his conduct is called in question. This if! a great 
and ancient maxim of equity, applicable to all va-
riety of relations in \\·hich influence or dominion 
may be exercised by one person over another: 
'That great rule of court, that he who bargains 
in matter of advantage with a person placing con-
fidence in him, is hound to show a reasonable usc 
of that confidence; a rule applying to trustees, 
attorneys, or anyone else.' Gibson v. ,Joyes, 6 Ves . 
. Jr. 266, :n l·;ng-. Ucp.l844 (Ch.1801). 
"ls the attorney's poflition different when his 
conduct is called into question ir1 a disciplinary 
pro<.'ccding1 We think it is not, at least when the 
court is satisfied with reasonable certainty, as is 
the c•ase here, that a 11rima facie case of discipli-
nary misconduct has been made out against the 
at.lorney. In such a case, the decisions uniformly 
hold that the burden of overcoming such prima. 
facie case by evidence ref!ts on tllC attorney. See 
7 CJS, ~'l..ttorncy & Client, Sec. 33, p. 781, where the 
following cases are cited: ln re Graves, 64 Cal. 
App. 176, 221 Pa. 411 (D. Ct.. App. 19:53); In re 
Horovit:r., 228 App. Dlv. 484, 240 NYS 343 (App. 
Div. Hl30) ; In re Fieldstccl, 228 A pp. Div. 470, 240 
KYS 481 (App. Div. 1930); In re Kunstler, 248 
App. Div. 393, 289 NYS 107 (App. Div. 1936); in 
re Salus, 321 Pa.106, 184 A. 70 (S. Ct.1936); In rc 
Gery, 284 Pa. 121,130 A. 307 (S. Ct.1925); People 
ex rcl. Attorney-General v. La~ka, 105 Col. 426,101 
P. 2d 33, (St. Ct. 1940); In re Lennox, 371 TIL 505, 
21 XE 2d J21 ( 8. Ct. 1939) ; ln rc .:vr cluick, 383 Til. 
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200 48 Nill2d 935 (S. Ct. 1943). As it is abhorrent 
to the law and our ethieal code t.lntt an attorney 
should derixe a benefit. to himself from the misuse 
of the confidence arising from the attorney-clieiJt 
relation, ''vhere from the attendant circumstance 
there is a reason io ptesume that the attorney pos-
sessed some marked influence, ascendancy or other 
advantage over his client~ * *' t.he law supersedes 
the neeessity of any inquiry into tl11c particular 
mean~, l''ftent and exertion of influence in a given 
case; a task often diflicult., and ill supported by 
evidence which can be drawn from ar1Y satisfaetorv 
somces. T Story on Equity ,Turisp;udence (14th 
Ed. 1918), sec. 433. Thu~, the court being satisfied 
with reasonable certainty that a f!l"ima facie case 
of <<lm~e in violation of Cannon 11, hy IITI attorney 
of adient'.:; confidence for his personal profit or 
g-ain l1as been made out, it is right and just 1o re-
quire tktt H1e attorney shall prove either that no 
advantage of l1is client 'NUS taken or that the ad-
Yantage r0r.eived 11a.~ rr.eeived without a speck of 
impn~ition on his JJart and \\"US the result of <i well 
eonl:iider0d, definite and sPttlPd purpo~r on the 
part of the d.ient.. In t.his wa.'· suhs1ance and mean-
ing arc given to the high princlples of conduct self. 
imposed hy our profession and eloquently articu-
lated over a century ago by }[r .• Justice Xclson 
:-;peaking for the Cnited States Supreme Court in 
Stoekton v. Ford, 11 How. 2~12, ;J2 L S. 232, ~47, 
13 L .!<;d. 676 (1850), where he said: 
'There are few of the business relations in 
life iuvol1·ing a higher trmt and eonfidence 
than that of attOI"nl'.'. and client, or generally 
speaking, 011e more Jwnorably and faithfully 
di~charged; few more anxiously guarded by 
th{' InK, or governed b~· sterner principles of 
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the 
court to administer them in a eorrespondi11g 
spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to 
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sec that (·onfidcnee thus reposed shall not be 
used to the detriment or prejudice of the 
rights of the party bestowing it.' 
"It is urged on behalf of the respondent that 
no presumption of undue influenee on lris part 
is createrl merely because he v.raf! named as 
truslee of the trnsl and as a similar fiduciary 
under t.Jw will, hot.h of whi(•h were prepared 
by him, that l"he construct.ive fraud principle 
applieable in cases where an attorney is made 
a beneficiary of a will or trust ·which is pre-
pared or supervised by himself hal'! no per-
Lint>ncy here because the respondent obtains 
no bcnefirial interest under cit.her doeument 
other t.han the fees and commissions for which 
he works. Bnt while the respondent is not. 
named as a cestui under the trust or as a lega-
tee or devise<> under the will of ::\.fis>- Brech-
woldt, the pow('rs granted to him arc so com-
plete and the di~{·rciiOTl given him so ah~oluh' 
thai ilis vo~itiou is tantamount to that of a 
bencfl('iary Further, he hafl treated the funds 
as his own ·without regarrl to his oblig11tion io 
bis donor or her rharitab\(' bcncfi('iarics. 
There is every indication t11at this respondent 
had inf!ured to f1imsclf' H1e eo11trol of this es-
state even beyond bis ovm lifetime. He put 
him~elf into a superior bargaining position aR 
far as lllt' ultimate benefieiarief! are eon-
cerned, so t.hat it would not be pradical for 
any ol t.bem to contest his actions because in 
the cxereiJ:Je of hiA absolute discretion he had 
the power to 'cut them off.' \Ve can gain b11t 
a hint of his purpose from the earlier will 
under which the respondent made himself a 
prineipal beneficiary of "\-Iiss Brechwoldt 'R 
bounty. A confidential relationship such as 
exiRted here between the respondent and Mi~;; 
Brechwoldt, plus the l'>idence of suspicious 
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circumstances constituting a strong prima 
facie case of misconduct, is enough to cast the 
burden on to the respondent to show by im-
peccably clear and convincing proof his free-
dom from fraudulent and unduly influential 
conduct. In re Rlake's will, 21 ~.J. 50,120 A. 
2d 745 (1956); 1n re Rittenhouse's Will, 19 
X.J. 370, lli A. 2d 401 (1955). lie has not 
come close to carrying that burden.'' 
"There is nothing wrong in an attorney 
accepting the confidence of a client and in 
managing his propert; aDd estate if tl1e client 
of his 011 n free and unfettered will desires to 
place ~url1 a trust in an att.oruey. But such 
a situation is fraught with danger for the 
attorn0y. 'rbc only way in which l1c can pro" 
teet himself i~ tbrough scrupulously proper 
conduct, not only iil the manner in which he 
deals with the property but in the documen-
tation of his actions. OlJl:· by being able to 
show clearly each and every m1e of his trans-
adiom no matter how long the period of time 
can he insure himself of being above re-
proach. It is not enough for him to sa;.c 'I 
have acted properly in the performance of 
my trust.' He must prove it." 
"There is no profession, san perhaps the 
ministr.1·, in which the highest morality is 
more necessary than that of the law. Shars-
wood, :H;ssay on Professional EU1i<'s (1896), 
p. 55. 
'There is in fact, no 1oeation in life where 
moral character counts for so much or where 
it is subjedC'd 10 more crucial tests by citizen 
and the publie than is that of members of the 
bar. " • "' The fidelity and candor with 
which he performs his trust, point up reasons 
that distinguish t1IC legal profession from 
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other business.' ~tate ex rei. Florida Bar v . 
.Murrell, Fla., 74 So. 2d 221, 224 (Sup. Ct. 
1964). 
"It has been very aptly said that there is no 
profession apart from the legal profession where 
there is g-r"(•aler dispar·ity bciwcen hue character 
and reputation. Tlre fault lies in the lack of under-
standing by the public pr:iJ:JCipally provoked by 
the iransgessors among ns -not so much by the 
flagrant violators, because the public io; quick to 
appreciate the inevit.ahlcness of their existence, 
but by those members who by unconscionable con-
duct tip the dcli(Jatc' balmwe in wlricl1 trust and 
confidence in a lawyer's actions hangs; not so 
much l1y malefactiom! which are branded criminal 
hut by those that are in the twilight zone of low 
morality. 
''\Ve discipline not to puni:;h, but to purify tbe 
bar, lo inNo.·a~l' its reputation and to protect the 
public and the eourts from fraud and impo.'<ition. 
In rc Breidt, 84 N.J. Eq. :!2~-. 214 (Chi. 1915). 
"It io; the judgment of the court that the re-
spondent was guilty of violating Canon 11 in the 
ways descT"iLed. 
"'l'he diseipline imrwsed is tlmt. the respond-
ent he disbarred." 
It is true thal this case was decided l1y n t!iviJed 
court. 'rhree justi(~cs Uissented, but they did not disagree 
with the reasoning of the majority of the court as sd 
forth above. ']'he point of eoutention was o:imply a quP.'\-
tion ol" testamenlary eapacit;' and the assertion that 
the purpoRe of diseiplinary proeeedi11gs are to prott>ct 
the public rather than to puni:;h tlw attomey. The attor-
ney therein disbarred was not tlwn pnwti(·in~ law a.nd he 
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had sufferf'd considemble misfortune since l1is miscon-
duct. The dissenting j u~1 ii·c•fi thought UHtt it was unneces-
sary to add to bis burden. This is reflected by the fol-
lowing statement from the dissc·nting opinion: 
''The reiipondent is now 75 years of age and 
ha8 practiced at 1luc liar for 50 years with dis-
tinction, having been a member of the judiciary. 
lie was humiliatC"d ar1d depressE"d Uy publieity 
c•oncerning the aftermath of an unfortunate mat-
rimonial venture, tlE"stroying the prhlc he once 
possessed aR an aJJthori.ty in the field of domestic 
relations. He is mentally aJHl physically impaired 
to a degree where hf' no longer possesses the mind 
or the body to permit him to adequately defend 
f1im~elf against the charges made. 
'' T n this instance the public needg no further 
protection. Xaturc has amply and permanently 
proYided it. lle is largely ineapa(•itated mentally 
and pl1y~i,·ally and unable to praetice law or any 
oU1er u~"ful oeeupation. lie has left the jurisdic-
tion, seeking elsewhere some modicum of comfort 
and eon~olation. 'l'he devaf!tatlon wrought hy his 
mi~fort1mes jg best reflected in his attempted 
SlJicide and the note he left revealing his pathetic 
apprai~al of continued worldly existence. 
''Tl1e majority concluf!ions, according to my 
\·ic·w, ('Ome more within the classification of pun-
is]nrH"Ht of tlu' re01pondent than publi(' protection, 
ano:l I t"rmnot. on the record before me, vote to 
blo(·k out the few day:; of dim sunshine which still 
rernai.n for him.'' 
'l'h(~ on[~- other C<Jse Wl" can find ,,·hich has fad~ simi-
lar to (.l1e fnet~ here present is the nl~C" of In rc Mango;n, 
32 A. :ld 673 (Vermont) deciLled in 1943. 
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In this case one ::!rfary Lamb was a woman 77 years 
of age. Her sister had died and she employed an attor-
ney to probate the sister's estate. Before ll1l' probate 
could be completed the attorney died and :!."Iangan was 
retained to complete the probate proceedings. :\li;;~ Lamb 
had a savings account. in a bank of some ~9,000. Shere-
ceived notice from the bank t.hat they would not pay any 
intcr·est on money over $5,000. ~fangan had f>Iiss Lamb 
withdraw the excess m·er $5,000 and deposit it in a joint 
account with him. 
At about the same time as the joint account was 
created he drew a will for .\1 iH~ Lamb in which he was 
named as t.he principal benefleiary. He drew the will and 
was prE'sent when it was witnessed. 
During 1Ii~s Lamb's lifetime :Mangan withdrew 
money from the joiut aecount for his pet·sonal needs with 
"\fiss I.amb's consent. Shortly bel"orc 11-Iiss Lamb's death 
}Iangan withdrew the full amount and deposited it. to 
hi; own account. 
The findings of the hearing commission, as set out 
in the opinion of tlte coud du not disclose any overt acts 
of fraud or undue influenec nn the part of :Jiangan rela-
tive to the ereation of tlw joint aceount or the executiOJt of 
the will. The Commi.sHion al~o found that TVIaJ"Y l.amb had 
tet.amentary capacity. '.rhe judgment of the c.ourt was 
that Mangan he disbarred. 
The general rule relative to 01<' conduct of attor-
n,~y·s in their relationship wilh t.heir clients is that any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
adions on his part which casts reflection npon the pro-
fession in the eye~:~ of the public makes l1im subject to 
di~:~ciplinc. 
The Utah Supreme Court ha:; held tl1at the standard 
of quantum of proof which should govern the court in 
a disbarment proceeding i~:~ that: 
'_'t~e charges sholJltl be clearly sustained by 
convwcmg proof and a fair preponderance of the 
evidence. 'l'h0 evidence should be clear and 
convincing.'' 
See ln re ii11Cunough, 97 L'tah [J:J3, 95 P. 2d 13. See also 
J.n re Erans wnd Rogers, 22 Ctah 366, 62 P. 913, 53 LRA 
952, 83 Am St. Hep. 794, and ht re Hanson, 48 l:tah 163, 
158 Pae. 7'18. 
COXCLlJSION 
We have not been able to find other cases either one 
way or the other on the presumption problem. If the pre-
sumption of fraud is raised in a disbarment proceeding, 
then we believe H1at disciplinary actior1 must follow auto-
mat.i('ally. Tlw Supreme Court of l·tah 1111:> already held 
in the civil pnrt of thi~ matter that the presumption of 
fraud in the civil case could be oYercome by a mere pre-
ponflerance of the evidence. It then 'n·ut on to hold tl1at. 
Mr. Macfarlane had not by a preponderance of tb1• evi-
dence shown freedom from fraud. If there is any pre-
sumption at all rais0d in 11 rlisbarment proceeding, it must 
be a presumption at le:1st that strong, and if this identical 
evidence wn~ not strong enough to overcome the presump-
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tion in the civil case, it likewise does not overcome it in 
this case. 
"\Ve have here an affirmative proof of questionable 
conduct. An attorney employed to protect the property 
interests of a person with a retarded ment.ality, accepts 
from her during her lifetime many valuable giftf!, he 
stands by while like gifts are made to ?\Ir. Kostopoh1~, he 
drew a will which makes him a major beneficiary, etc. To 
these affirmatively established facts must be added the 
adjudicated fact that he has defrauded his client of prop-
erty with a value of over $100,000.00, and in that adjudi-
cation the property has been taken from him. The same 
identical evidence is before the Supreme Court again for 
review. If (1) the comt can consider the adjudicated fact 
of the fraud, or (2) if the court may raise the presump-
tion of fraud, then we think it mnf!t follow that f!ome 
discipline is required. If the court may not conflider the 
adjudicated fact of the fraud, nor may not raise the pre-
sumption because of the nature of a disbarment proceed-
ing, and the fads which give rise to the presumption will 
not of themselves warrant diseiplinary adion, then, of 
course, the findings should be reversed, and the court 
should again advise the public that 1\lr .. .\tacfarlanc's 
conduct was entirely proper and that he is entitled to re-
ceive the Supreme Court's recommendation to tho puhlic 
that he is a man in whom the public may repose the great-
est confidence and trust. and that the har in general may 
as a matter of ethics engage in this type of conduct, al-
though if a civil suit is iJlitiatcd agaim;t them, their con-
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duct will be fraudulent and the property must be taken 
from them. 
"\Ve submit that such au anomalous end result ought 
not to be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
RAY R. CHlllS'J:E~SEN 
NED WARNOCK 
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